We revisit Fujiwara's (2008) di¤erential duopoly game to show that the degenerate nonlinear feedback identi…ed by the tangency point with the stationary state line is indeed unstable, given the dynamics of the natural resource exploited by …rms. To do so, we fully characterise the continuum of nonlinear feedback solution via Rowat's (2007) method, characterising the in…nitely many stable nonlinear feedback equilibria.
Introduction
We revisit Fujiwara's (2008) to be an equilibrium strategy. At …rst sight, they are violated in the present model but such a guess is incorrect since Rowat (2007) assumes that player i's payo¤ does not depend on its rival's strategy".
The purpose of our rejoinder is (i) to show that the tangency solution is indeed unstable due to the dynamic properties of the model, and (ii) to characterise the continuum of stable nonlinear feedback equilibria identi…ed by the appropriate intersections between isoclines and the steady state locus.
Each of the equilibria belonging to this set can be reached provided that the initial stock of the resource is low enough. To this aim, we strictly follow Rowat's (2007) procedure. 1 The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 illustrates the setup. The linear feedback solution is illustrated in section 3. Nonlinear feedback strategies are dealt with in section 4. Concluding remarks are in section 5.
1 Rowat (2007) uses a model where players have quadratic loss functions which are additively separable w.r.t. players'controls. This has the consequence that instantaneous best replies in the control space are orthogonal to each other, which is the source of Fujiwara's observation. However, this feature is altogether unrelated to the stability issue, as the ensuing analysis is about to illustrate.
2
The setup is the same as in Benchekroun (2003) , Fujiwara (2008) and Colombo and Labrecciosa (2015) . The model illustrates a di¤erential oligopoly game of resource extraction unravelling over continuous time t 2 [0; 1) : The market is supplied by two fully symmetric …rms 2 producing a homogeneous good, whose inverse demand function is p = a X at any time t, with
Firms share the same technology, characterised by marginal cost c 2 (0; a) ; constant over time. The individual instantaneous pro…t function is i = (p c) x i . Firms exploit a common pool renewable resource, whose evolution over time is described by the following dynamics:
with
where S is the resource stock, k > 0 is its implicit growth rate when the stock is at most equal to S y and kS y is the maximum sustainable yield.
Taken together, (1-2) imply that (i) if the resource stock is su¢ ciently small the population grows at an exponential rate; and (ii) beyond S y , the asset grows at a decreasing rate. Moreover, S max is the carrying capacity of the habitat, beyond which the growth rate of the resource is negative, being limited by available amounts of food and space. In the remainder, we will con…ne our attention to the case in which F (S) = kS, as in Fujiwara (2008).
Firms play noncooperatively and choose their respective outputs simultaneously at every instant. In the remainder, in order to save upon notation, we will pose a c > 0. The i-th …rm maximises the discounted pro…t ‡ow
under the constraint posed by the state equation
The initial condition is S (0) = S 0 > 0. Parameter r > 0 is the discount rate, common to all managers and constant over time. To guarantee the positivity of the residual resource stock at the steady state under linear feedback strategies, the ensuing analysis will be carried out under the following assumption (cf. Fujiwara, 2008, p. 218):
If …rms don't internalise the consequences of their behaviour at any time and play the individual (static) Cournot-Nash output x CN = =3 at all times, then the residual amount of the natural resource in steady state is
As the ensuing analysis illustrates, the static solution indeed corresponds to the open-loop one, which is unstable.
The linear feedback solution
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) of …rm i is
where V i (S) is …rm i's value function, and V 0 i (S) = @V i (S) =@S: The …rst order condition (FOC) on x i is
In view of the ex ante symmetry across …rms, we impose the symmetry conditions x i = x (S) and V i (S) = V (S) for all i and solve FOC (6) to obtain
where superscript F stands for feedback. Consider the case where (5), the latter can be rewritten as follows:
Then, we may pose
From (8) we obtain the following system of Riccati equations:
Equations ( 
whereby, if 1 = 11 ; the individual equilibrium output is x F 1 (S) = x CN = x OL ; i.e., the open-loop production level, 3 while if 1 = 12 ; the individual equilibrium output is
If x = x F 2 (S) ; the steady state level of the natural resource stock is
for all values of k satisfying Assumption 1. In the remainder, we de…ne
Nonlinear feedback equilibria
To characterise the continuum of nonlinear feedback solutions, we adopt the same procedure as in Rowat (2007), 4 again con…ning to symmetric equilibria.
Imposing the symmetry condition x i = x (S) for all i and solving (6), we obtain V 0 (S) = 3x (S) : Substituting this into (5), di¤erentiating both sides with respect to S and rearranging, any feedback strategy is implicitly identi…ed by
which must hold together with the terminal condition lim t!1 e rt V (s) = 0.
From (16) we see that
Since the feedback control x F (S) is (7), the HJB equation is rV (S)
Otherwise, the HJB equation is (8), whereby
(19) can be di¤erentiated w.r.t. S on both sides, to obtain
where w (S) V 0 (S) and 6 = [5kS + 4w (S)] =5. Equation (20) can be usefully rewritten through a transformation of variables using w = { + A and S = + B; with A = 0 and B = 5 = (9k) ; into
which, de…ning z {= ; whereby { = z and @{=@ = z + @z=@ ;
rewrites as
This has two constant solutions, z a = 0 and z b = 9 (r 2k) =8. Going back to the original control variables, we have
where A and B are known. The levels of S solving S = 0 at x = x a and x = x b are, respectively,
with S b < B since k > 5r=2 > 3r=2. Then, for z 6 = fz a ; z b g ; one can solve
where coe¢ cients a = k= (2k r) and b = (k r) = (2k r) are univocally determined through the method of partial fractions. Integrating (25), we
and M can be rewritten in terms of w (S) and S as follows: 
where S LF = S F 2 ; S T = nx T =k and x LF = x F 2 at S = S LF .
The foregoing analysis proves the following: 
Concluding remarks
We have used the same approach as in Rowat (2007) to identify the continuum of nonlinear feedback equilibria arising in a game of duopolistic exploitation of a renewable resource initially investigated by Benchekroun (2003) and Fujiwara (2008) . In doing so, we have also shown that the degenerate nonlinear tangency solution is indeed unstable.
